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Dana R. Hermanson*
Introduction
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE 2016, 6) defines occupational fraud as “the use of one’s occupation
for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization’s resources or
assets.” In this study, we investigate how managers respond to occupational fraud, considering differences in the treatment
of star employees versus average employees. Further, and reflecting the primary focus of the study, we examine the
consequences for management control systems when an average employee subsequently commits occupational fraud after
top management has previously tolerated/not tolerated a star employee’s similar behavior.
Call, Nyberg, and Thatcher (2015, 623) define a star employee as one who “…exhibit(s) disproportionately high and
prolonged (1) performance, (2) visibility, and (3) relevant social capital.” Thus, star employees are employees who bring a
material amount of value to a company. Under this definition, a star employee may work in any area of a firm, including:
the executive suite, sales, operations, finance, or supply-chain management, or may lead a group that contributes a material
amount of value to a firm.
Research has reported that a certain type of star employee (top-producing salespeople) is treated differently than lowerproducing salespeople because of the perceived benefit derived from the performance of top-producing salespeople (Bellizzi
and Hasty, 2003). Thus, the esteem in which sales star employees are sometimes held gives them the unique ability to
engage in pro-company unethical acts (e.g., to make a sale) if they desire to do so (Bellizzi, 2006; Bellizzi and Bristol, 2005;
Bellizzi and Hasty, 2003). The sales star employee’s unethical behavior may be tolerated by managers because the benefits
derived from the star employee’s activities outweigh the costs of the behavior. There are also circumstances where managers
will tolerate unethical behavior because they fear the possible consequences if the unethical act is exposed, such as loss of
job security, income, or promotion (Bellizzi and Bristol, 2005; Bellizzi and Hasty, 2003).
Previous research has focused on sales star employees who commit pro-company unethical acts—acts designed to help
make a sale. In this study, we examine occupational fraud (i.e., anti-company behavior) perpetrated by an operations team
leader (Experiment 1) and a warehouse manager (Experiment 2); employees outside of the sales realm. In this manner, we
shift the focus of this line of research from “corrupt organizations,” where the organization is the beneficiary of the unethical
act, to “organizations of corrupt individuals,” who personally benefit from their unethical acts (Pinto, Leana, and Pil, 2008).
Thus, we seek to draw broader conclusions related to management control systems and the impact of the tone at the top than
are possible when examining pro-company unethical actions within the sales function.
Experiment 1 sets the stage for Experiment 2 by contributing to our understanding of manager decisions for occupational
fraud committed by star employees. Specifically, using Mitchell and Wood’s (1980) causal attribution model to develop
our hypotheses, we examine in the first experiment whether non-sales star employees are permitted to engage in more
occupational fraud than average employees. We also investigate whether the magnitude of the act and the interaction of the
type of employee and the magnitude of the act have an effect on a manager’s handling of such acts. Using a 2x2 (star
employee or average employee, and small or large act) between-subjects experiment administered to 119 managers,
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Experiment 1 indicates that participants perceive that most managers they have worked with treat star employees more
leniently than average employees.1
Experiment 2, our primary focus, is motivated by the high costs of a poor ethical tone that is tolerant of occupational fraud
(ACFE, 2016; CAQ, 2010; NCFFR, 1987) and harmful to an organization’s management control systems. Trompeter,
Carpenter, Jones, and Riley (2014, 786) indicate that accounting researchers should “…refine the examinations of leadership
and tone at the top in the contexts of poor ethical decision making” and investigate how “specific changes in tone at the top”
affect employee ethical decision-making. Further, Davis and Pesch (2013) model the spread of organizational fraud and call
for more research on the effects of such elements as fairness, disciplinary actions, and fraud magnitude. We seek to begin
to respond to these calls in the accounting literature for more research in this area.
Prior research has reported that tolerating unethical behavior from one employee affects the ethical decisions that other
employees make (Ashkanasy, Windsor, and Treviño, 2006).2 Painter-Morland (2006) argues that employees’ tacit
knowledge of tolerated unethical acts may lead to tacit collusion, where employees feel pressure to adhere to the firm’s
unofficial ethical rules as opposed to the official code of ethics. To our knowledge, there has been no prior accounting
research that has investigated how stakeholder tolerance of occupational fraud by a star employee affects a manager’s
tolerance and discipline intensity decisions for subsequent acts perpetrated by an average employee. Using a second 2x2
(star employee’s prior occupational fraud tolerated or not tolerated, and small or large act) between-subjects experiment
administered to 108 managers who did not take part in the first experiment. Experiment 2 provides evidence that managers
are more lenient with an average employee when a star employee has been able to get away with a similar act previously,
thus weakening management control systems.
Overall, we find evidence suggesting that treating star employees more leniently than average employees can lead to future
leniency for average employees as well, which may serve to spread occupational fraud throughout the organization;
potentially sending a negative signal about the organization’s tone at the top. Thus, management control systems are
weakened when an organization selectively overrides internal controls for star employees.
The next section presents Experiment 1, followed by a separate section presenting Experiment 2. The final section presents
our conclusions and develops implications and avenues for future research.
Experiment 1: Theory—Causal Attribution: Leader’s Response to Subordinate Poor Behavior
Attribution theory deals with the causal attributions an individual use to determine why someone has behaved in a certain
way and what is done with this information (Kelley, 1973). Using causal attribution theory as the foundation of their theorybuilding article, Mitchell and Wood (1980) developed a model for analyzing a leader’s diagnosis and response to an
employee’s poor performance. As shown in Figure 1, this model includes six primary factors that impact the disciplinary
decision managers make in response to subordinate poor behavior.
The behavior and/or outcome factor in the model is the poor behavior exhibited by the employee (Mitchell and Wood,
1980). The factors that influence a manager’s response to unethical behavior are: (1) situational and informational factors,
(2) bias, (3) causal attributions [internal and external], (4) personal or organizational policies, (5) expectations for future
performance, and (6) costs/benefits (Mitchell and Wood, 1980). [see Figure 1, pg 310]
Of particular relevance to the current study is the costs/benefits factor of Mitchell and Wood’s (1980) model.3 The
cost/benefits factor is the costs associated with, and the benefit derived from, implementing a given response to a
subordinate’s poor behavior. Costs/benefits include the act being a pro-company unethical act (e.g., misrepresenting demand
to a customer to gain a higher price from the customer) versus occupational fraud (e.g., an anti-company unethical act, such
1

Below, we discuss the presence of social desirability bias in certain responses and thus our focus on what most managers would do in
the Experiment 1 case setting, as opposed to what the participant would do.
2
Further, research in auditing finds that employee behavior is influenced by the tone set by the organization’s culture. Carpenter and
Reimers (2013) found that the level of professional skepticism exhibited by audit managers was influenced by an audit partner’s high
or low emphasis on professional skepticism. Pickerd, Summers, and Wood (2015) reported that the ethical behavior of lower-level
staff accountants in public accounting is contingent upon the ethical tone of both the partner and the front-line supervisor.
3
In the interest of parsimony and because our manipulations are expected to affect only the costs/benefits factor in the model, we do
not include a discussion of all the factors in Mitchell and Wood’s (1980) causal attribution model. For a complete discussion of the
other factors in the model see Mitchell and Wood (1980).
295

Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting
Volume 10: Issue 3, July–December 2018
as asset misappropriation) and organizational consequences (e.g., loss of a customer, regulatory and legal consequences)
(DeConinck, 1992; Bellizzi, 2006). The costs/benefits factor can be influenced by the consequences for the manager making
the disciplinary decision, such as affecting the manager’s current and future income, future promotions, and job security
(Bellizzi and Hasty, 2003; Bellizzi and Bristol, 2005). We argue that a manager would weigh the costs/benefits of the
subordinate’s occupational fraud before deciding on a response.
Hypotheses
Research supports the premise that managers often tolerate unethical behavior perpetrated by sales star employees (Bellizzi
and Bristol, 2005; Bellizzi and Hasty, 2003; Marchetti 1997). In particular, this literature shows that sales managers tolerate
unethical behavior because the perceived benefits to the company and to the sales manager derived from the star employees’
activities outweigh the costs (Bellizzi and Bristol, 2005; Bellizzi and Hasty, 2003; Hoogervorst, De Cremer, and van Dijke,
2010; Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga, 1993). Tolerance of star employee behavior has been linked to the sales manager seeking
to avoid the loss of talent and sales to competitors, as well as efforts to maintain the sales manager’s income, continued
employment, and promotion opportunities (Bellizzi and Bristol, 2005).4
Experiment 1 of this study extends existing literature by moving beyond the sales manager-salesperson relationship and
pro-company unethical acts to non-sales star employees and occupational fraud. We examine whether managers in general
are more tolerant of occupational fraud from star employees than they are of similar acts exhibited by average employees.
In a manager-star employee relationship, the manager may tolerate occupational fraud because of the benefit the manager
receives when the manager’s bonus is significantly affected in the future by the star employee’s activities.5 This argument
is supported theoretically by Mitchell and Wood’s (1980) causal attribution model.
Mitchell and Wood (1980) posit that after the initial causal attribution is made, the manager must weigh the costs/benefits
associated with the manager’s response before making a final decision on how to respond to the unethical behavior. The
star employee has the status of being an employee who brings substantial value to the company, and the average employee
brings adequate value to the company. The benefit associated with tolerating the star employee’s occupational fraud is the
expectation that the star employee will continue to significantly contribute to the manager’s bonus in the future. One cost
associated with tolerating either the star employee’s or the average employee’s occupational fraud is that similar behavior
may be perpetrated in the future by the employee if the act is tolerated or if the employee is not disciplined. Specifically,
lower- and middle-level managers’ discipline/tolerance responses are likely influenced by the actual ethical climate of the
firm, as opposed to the officially promulgated ethical tone that may be promoted by the organization to the public and
employees by senior executives (Ashforth and Anand, 2003). Thus, tolerating star employees’ fraudulent actions may serve
to signal a firm’s weak tone at the top. When this occurs, the firm’s management control systems are made less effective,
and it is likely that management controls will be overridden in the future as employees engage in similar acts (this is directly
addressed in Experiment 2). Other costs of tolerating occupational fraud include direct financial losses by the company, as
well as the manager’s risk of being sanctioned for tolerating the act.
As a result of the manager’s consideration of the costs/benefits factor, the manager’s response may be to tolerate the star
employee’s occupational fraud due to the high benefits (i.e., greater personal bonuses in the future), thus administering
lower discipline intensity than would be administered to an average employee. For the average employee, the manager’s
response may be to have less tolerance and to administer a higher level of discipline intensity than would be administered
to the star employee, as the manager will not receive much direct benefit from the average employee. This example
demonstrates how a manager could have two different tolerance/discipline intensity responses for the same fraudulent
behavior exhibited by a star employee versus an average employee, as the two employees will have different effects on the
manager’s bonus in future periods.

4

Research also has found that organizational identification and reciprocity beliefs are associated with pro-company unethical acts
(Umphress, Bingham, and Mitchell, 2010). Further, Kennedy and Anderson (2017) report that higher-rank individuals are more likely
to view unethical group behavior as ethical than are those with a lower rank.
5
Bellizzi (2006) speculated that sales managers were tolerant of unethical behavior in top producing salespeople because the
practicing sales managers know from experience that they would be directly benefiting from the salespersons’ activities through either
a bonus or commission. In order to perform a similar study to Bellizzi (2006), Bellizzi and Bristol (2005), and Bellizzi and Hasty
(2003), we chose to explicitly explain in the instrument that the non-sales employee’s activities either materially contributed or did not
materially contribute to the manager’s bonus.
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In our first hypothesis, we expect that star employees will receive less discipline intensity and more tolerance for
occupational fraud than average employees who perpetrate the same act. Based on the discussion above, we present the
following directional hypothesis:
H1: Managers will administer less intense discipline for, and will be more tolerant of, star employees’ occupational
fraud than average employees’ occupational fraud.
The next factor in this study concerns the magnitude of the fraudulent act. The present study focuses on misappropriating
company funds for personal use, i.e., improperly charging personal expenses on a company credit card. A smaller act of
misappropriation ($500 or less) would be considered a misdemeanor, while a misappropriation of $501 or more would
increase the crime to a felony (Scheb, 2014).
The costs/benefits associated with a larger fraudulent act are different from those associated with a smaller act. Specifically,
the higher magnitude associated with a larger act results in greater negative consequences for both the company and the
manager if a tolerated act is exposed. This is expected to cause the manager to make a different discipline intensity decision
for a larger act than for a smaller act.
When the personal expense is large, the cost of tolerating the act becomes large, as the employee has committed a large
theft from the company and the manager’s tolerance of the act seemingly condones material theft. Thus, the manager knows
that to protect the company and herself, higher discipline intensity must be administered. As a result, the star employee and
average employee likely receive greater discipline/less tolerance when the act is large because the higher cost of tolerating
the act begins to outweigh the benefits gained by allowing either a star employee or average employee to engage in the act.
Likewise, the effect of the magnitude, or moral intensity, of an act in business is supported by research (Cohen and Bennie,
2006).6
This example demonstrates how the tolerance and the discipline intensity administered can vary based on the magnitude of
the fraudulent act perpetrated by the subordinate. We predict that a smaller magnitude act will result in more tolerance (less
discipline) from a manager than a larger act, regardless of the type of employee engaging in the act. Expressed formally as
a hypothesis:
H2: Manager discipline intensity increases and tolerance for occupational fraud decreases as the magnitude of the
act increases.
The final factor considered in Experiment 1 is the interaction of the type of employee and the magnitude of the act.
DeConinck (1992) reported that there were differences between the discipline given to a low-producer as opposed to a topproducer regardless of the consequences to the company. Bellizzi (2006) reported that under both serious and less serious
consequences to the company the top-producing salesperson received less severe discipline than the low-producer did and
observed that the results “...further demonstrate the seeming advantages of being a top sales performer” (196).
The literature discussed thus far indicates that top-producing salespeople are treated more leniently for unethical behavior
regardless of the magnitude of the act or the consequences to the organization for the unethical act (i.e., no interaction).
However, these findings may be the result of the pro-company unethical behaviors used in those studies; specifically, the
salespeople typically are engaged in questionable acts in order to sell more of the product to customers, which is beneficial
to the company and to the sales manager (Bellizzi and Bristol, 2005; Bellizzi and Hasty, 2003; DeConinck, 1992).
We argue above that managers in general are influenced by both the type of employee being disciplined (H1) and the
magnitude of the fraudulent act (H2). However, as the magnitude of the act increases, the discipline intensity and tolerance
responses are expected to become similar for both the star employee and the average employee. In essence, if the act
becomes large enough, even a star employee will not be able to escape discipline. Specifically, the costs/benefits factor of
Mitchell and Wood’s (1980) model would likely cause a manager to evaluate the consequences to both the manager and
6

Moral intensity, from the issue-contingent factor theory model, is one of several theoretical models that support the premise that the
magnitude of the act impacts the costs/benefits decision a manager makes. Moral intensity’s effect on ethical decision-making has
been supported by literature from a variety of academic disciplines (see Arnold, Dorminey, Neidermeyer, and Neidermeyer, 2013;
Arel, Beaudoin, and Cianci, 2012; Cohen and Bennie, 2006; Coram, Glavovic, Ng, and Woodliff, 2008; Singhapakdi, Vitell, and
Kraft, 1996). For simplicity, we build our predictions using the causal attribution model, but we recognize that moral intensity from
the issue-contingent factor theory model yields similar predictions.
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company if the manager is discovered to have exhibited greater tolerance for a larger fraudulent act. Thus, we predict that
the tolerance and discipline intensity administered by a manager will become similar for both.
H3: As the magnitude of the fraudulent act increases, manager discipline intensity star employee and average
employee as the magnitude of the act increases. Stated formally: (tolerance) for both star employees and
average employees increases (decreases), such that the discipline intensity and manager tolerance response
will become more similar for star employees and average employees (an interaction between employee type
and act magnitude).
Method
Participants
We collected the data from participants who had earned at least a bachelor degree and had at least one year of professional
management experience.7 We obtained the sample through Amazon’s Mechanical TURK (MTURK) marketplace as a
Human Intelligence Task (HIT), which is a service that matches projects with participants who have shown a willingness
to participate in online studies. Brandon, Long, Loraas, Mueller-Phillips, and Vansant (2014) posit that MTURK is
comparable to Qualtrics Research Panel service and Survey Monkey audience recruitment services.8
The participants first took a screening instrument administered online with Qualtrics. The screening instrument was
developed to screen participants on three criteria: (1) the participant’s attention to the task,9 (2) education, and (3)
management experience.
The HIT was listed in the MTURK marketplace under the heading “Qualification for $2.50 Academic Survey on Managerial
Decision Making”, and the HIT was only open to individuals living in the United States.10 A total of 960 participants took
the screening instrument in Qualtrics. Of the 960 participants who took the screening instrument, 327 exceeded the cut
scores for the inattention scale,11 749 indicated they had at least one year of management experience, and 562 reported that
they had earned at least a bachelor degree. The average time to complete the screening instrument was 8.44 minutes. One
hundred fifty-six participants passed all three criteria of the screening instrument and were invited to participate in the main
study.
Experimental Case Study and Independent Variables
Experiment 1 employs a case that is influenced by Bellizzi and Bristol (2005) and a questionnaire to determine whether star
employees are permitted to engage in more occupational fraud than average employees in organizations and whether this
effect varies with the magnitude of the act. The case in this study asks the participant to assume the role of an operations
manager at a specialty printing company who is required to make a disciplinary decision concerning Chris, a team leader
7

Research from multiple disciplines has reported that students may not be adequate surrogates for businesspeople in business
behavioral research (Burnett and Dunne, 1986; Copeland et al., 1973; Hughes and Gibson ,1991). Shields et al., (1981) reported that
participants with real work experience are more attuned than undergraduates to the factors that affect workplace performance and
decisions. The participants in their study had a mean age of thirty-one years and a mean of five years of work experience. The mean
age for Experiment 1 participants is 36.86 years, with a mean of 5.19 years of professional management experience. Additionally, 88.2
percent of the participants in Experiment 1 had witnessed a small ethics violation as a manager, 58.8 percent had reprimanded
someone they managed for an ethics violation, and 49.6 percent had observed one category of employee receive less severe
punishment than other employees for the same violation. Thus, the participants in Experiment 1 have the requisite professional
experience necessary to make the ethical discipline/tolerance decisions requested in the experimental case instrument.
8
Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz (2012) reported relatively small differences between U.S. MTURK respondents and the general U.S.
population. Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis (2010) support the use of MTURK in behavioral research by observing that MTURK
participants “…exhibit the classic heuristics and biases and pay attention to directions at least as much as subjects from traditional
sources” (417). Ferrell, Grenier, and Leiby (2017) report that online workers are acceptable proxies for non-expert decision-makers.
9
One of the possible disadvantages associated with recruiting participants from MTURK service is lack of participant effort in the
experiment (Paolacci et al., 2010). The authors suggest utilizing a non-experimental task to screen participants’ effort. We utilized the
Attentive Responding Scale 33 (ARS-33) developed by Maniaci and Rogge (2014). They report that the use of the ARS-33 increased
the statistical power of a sample and is effective in identifying potentially problematic participants.
10
The MTURK service allows researchers to limit the eligible workers for the HIT to MTURK workers living inside the United
States.
11
This study used the ARS-33 scale cut scores recommended by Maniaci and Rogge (2014).
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the operations manager supervises. The operations manager has discovered that Chris has made an inappropriate personal
charge for jewelry on a company credit card.
There are two manipulated independent variables in the experiment. The first independent variable addresses H1, which is
the classification of the perpetrator as a star employee or average employee. The star employee is described as a team leader
who is a “star employee” who brings substantial value to the company and whose leadership substantially increased the
operation manager’s annual bonus the previous five years. The average employee is described as a team leader who is an
“average employee” who brings adequate value to the company and whose leadership did not directly contribute to the
operation manager’s bonus the previous five years.
The second manipulated independent variable in the study addresses H2, which is the magnitude of the fraudulent act, larger
($5,000 unapproved credit card transaction for a personal purchase from an online jewelry store) or smaller ($500
unauthorized credit card transaction for a purchase from an online jewelry store).12 Finally, the interaction of employee type
and magnitude of the act addresses H3.
Dependent Variables
The experimental instrument asks about how the participants themselves would act in the experimental setting (a series of
questions to examine how they would personally respond and how various factors influenced their decision), as well as two
subsequent questions about how most managers they have worked with would act.13 The Most Managers questions were
included in the event we encountered social desirability bias. Social desirability bias (SBD) occurs when participants
respond to an ethical question in a more socially acceptable manner than the action they would actually take in practice, and
SDB has been found to affect self-reporting responses of participants in business ethics research (Bellizzi and Bristol, 2005;
Cohen and Pant, 1998; Cohen, Pant, and Sharp, 2001). We tested for SDB in the responses by comparing the means for the
most manager dependent variables to the corresponding self-reporting dependent variables (Cohen, Holder-Webb, Sharp,
and Pant, 2007). We found evidence of significant SDB in both the discipline and tolerance responses (see wording below).
Specifically, the participants indicated that they would administer more stringent discipline (p = 0.014) and be less tolerant
of the fraudulent act (p = 0.019) than would most managers they worked with. Tougher discipline and less tolerance reflect
more socially acceptable responses. Further, regarding the type of employee, the SDB is found only in the star employee
conditions (p = 0.008 in both cases), not in the average employee conditions (p > 0.500).
Based on the evidence of SDB and its concentration in the star employee condition (our test condition), we focus our analysis
of Experiment 1 on the Most Managers dependent variables. Thus, the first dependent variable question is, “What do you
think most managers you have worked with would do if confronted with the situation presented in this case?” (0 = “Do
Nothing”, 100 = “Terminate Chris”). This scale measures the discipline intensity response. The discipline intensity sliding
scale used in this study is a modification of Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga’s (1993) sales manager’s reaction to unethical
salesperson behavior scale that was developed to gauge the intensity of discipline a sales manager would administer to a
salesperson for unethical selling behavior. The second dependent variable question is, “How likely would it be that most
managers you have worked with would tolerate Chris’s violation of company policy?” (0 = “Not Likely”, 100 = “Very
Likely”). This scale measures the tolerance response.
Results
Manipulation Checks and Completion Time
One hundred fifty-three of the 156 invited participants took the main experimental case instrument. One hundred forty of
those invited completed the instrument. There were two manipulation check multiple choice questions in the instrument.
One manipulation check concerned the type of employee, and the other was concerned with the magnitude of the fraudulent
act. Of the 140 participants, 136 passed the employee type (star employee, average employee) manipulation check, 137
passed the magnitude of the act (smaller, larger) manipulation check, and 133 respondents passed both manipulation checks.
We also lost participants who did not meet the minimum criteria (at least a bachelor degree, one year of professional
12

We encourage future research with other measures of the act’s magnitude.
We acknowledge the design tradeoff/limitation of having participants evaluate the influence of various factors on their personal
response before having them indicate how most managers would respond. While the consideration of these personal factors
theoretically could affect the Most Managers responses, it also may have been awkward to have participants evaluate the influence of
various factors on their personal response after they had also indicated how most managers would respond.
299
13

Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting
Volume 10: Issue 3, July–December 2018
management experience, and living in the United States), to arrive at 119 participants in the final sample.14 Excluding the
three outliers (who apparently started the experiment one day and completed it on another day), the average time of
completion for those who passed all criteria is 21.91 minutes (median of twenty minutes).
Participants’ Perceptions of the Case
The respondents were asked to give their perceptions of case realism and understandability. The mean for realism of the
case is 73.92 (standard deviation of 23.18) on a scale of 0 to 100 with 0 being “Unrealistic” and 100 being “Very Realistic.”
The mean for understanding of the case is 91.04 (standard deviation of 20.33) on a scale of 0 to 100 with 0 being “Difficult
to Understand” and 100 being “Easy to Understand.”15
Demographics
Table 1 presents demographic information about the 119 participants. Fifty-four percent of the participants were male, and
seventy-two percent were age forty or younger. Most participants (sixty-seven percent) had five years or less of professional
management experience. Most (seventy-seven percent) of the participants were employed full-time, were currently
employed in low- or mid-level management positions (seventy-two percent) and were currently employed at a firm with
greater than fifty-one employees (sixty-nine percent). Nearly half (forty-eight percent) of the participants currently worked
for privately owned entities, twenty-two percent for publicly traded entities, and fourteen percent for not-for-profit entities.
Nearly all of the participants had a bachelor degree (sixty-eight percent), some graduate education (ten percent), or a
master/law degree (twenty percent). [see Table 1, pg 311]
MANOVA Results
The two Most Managers dependent variables (discipline and tolerance) are correlated (r = -0.591, p < 0.001), and as a result
we first run a MANOVA model (significant at p = 0.011). The results in Table 2, Panel A reveal that both employee type
and magnitude of the act are significant (each with p < 0.025), consistent with both H1 and H2.16 17 18 The MANOVA
reveals no evidence of an interaction between employee type and magnitude of the act (p = 0.509), inconsistent with H3.
[see Table 2, pg 312]
ANOVA Results
ANOVAs were performed using the Most Managers dependent variables. The descriptive statistics for the Most Managers
discipline intensity dependent variable, which asks, “What do you think most managers you have worked with would do if
confronted with the situation presented in this case?” (0 = “Do Nothing”, 100 = “Terminate Chris”), reveal that the means
for the discipline intensity administered for a star employee (69.15) and an average employee (78.15) are significantly
different (p = 0.030), consistent with H1. There is also a statistically significant difference between the means for a larger
(79.61) and smaller (68.24) magnitude act (p = 0.006), consistent with H2.
In the ANOVA for the discipline dependent variable (see Panel B of Table 2), the overall model is significant at p = 0.003,
as is the type of employee variable (p = 0.013, F = 6.36), lending support to H1.19 This suggests that employee type is a
14

No respondents failed the management experience requirement, twelve indicated that they did not have at least a bachelor degree,
and two indicated they were not currently residing in the United States. The MANOVA results in Table 2 are similar if we include all
respondents in the analysis (n = 140).
15
Both realistic and understandable have means that are significantly greater than the scale midpoint of 50 (p < 0.001).
16
Unless noted otherwise, all p-values in this study are two-tailed.
17
When added one a time to the MANOVA models in Tables 2 and 3, key demographic variables (i.e., gender, age, management
experience, full-time worker, company size, company type, and education) do not affect the primary results, except that magnitude of
the act becomes insignificant in one case in Table 3.
18
While the Breusch-Pagan test reveals no evidence of heteroskedasticity in the ANOVAs below (p > 0.05), the Levene’s Test
indicates evidence of heteroskedasticity in certain cases. As a sensitivity test, we use rank transformations of the dependent variables
for the MANOVA and ANOVAs as recommended by Conover and Iman (1981). The MANOVA and ANOVA results with rank
transformations are similar to those presented (except that in Table 2 Panel C, the magnitude of the act is significant (p = 0.039) when
the rank transformation is used).
19
The effect size is small for the type of employee (Cohen’s f = 0.235) (Cohen, 1988). A small effect size has a Cohen’s f greater than
or equal to 0.10 and less than 0.25, a medium effect size is greater than or equal to 0.25 and less than 0.40, and a large effect size is
greater than or equal to 0.40 (Cohen, 1988).
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driving factor in responses to the discipline question. Thus, there is evidence that employee type is relevant to the discipline
intensity decisions that most managers the participants have worked with make. This ANOVA also reveals that the
magnitude of the act variable is statistically significant (p = 0.003, F = 9.49) which lends support to H2. 20 The interaction
of the type of employee and magnitude of the act (H3) is not statistically significant (p = 0.745, F = 0.11) in the ANOVA,
inconsistent with H3.
The descriptive statistics for the Most Managers tolerance of the act dependent variable, which asks, “How likely would it
be that most managers you have worked with would tolerate Chris’s violation of company policy?” (0 = “Not Likely”, 100
= “Very Likely”), indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between the means for tolerance of a star
employee (31.37) and an average employee (19.88; p = 0.025), consistent with H1. There is no statistical difference between
the means for the large versus small act for this dependent variable (22.04 versus 28.84, respectively; p = 0.188), inconsistent
with H2.
As shown in Panel C of Table 2, the ANOVA for the tolerance dependent variable reveals that the overall model is
statistically significant (p = 0.035), as is the type of employee (p = 0.019, F = 5.63), lending support for H1.21 Again, this
provides evidence that occupational fraud committed by star employees will be treated differently by most managers the
participants have worked with than the same acts committed by average employees. In this model, the magnitude of the act
(H2) is not significant (p = 0.119, F = 2.47), inconsistent with H2. The interaction of the type of employee and the magnitude
of the act (H3) is not statistically significant (p = 0.267, F = 1.24), inconsistent with H3.22
In summary, the ANOVA results for Experiment 1 support H1, that most managers the participants have worked with will
likely administer less discipline intensity and be more tolerant of a star employee’s occupational fraud than an average
employee’s similar act. We also find evidence that the magnitude of the act (H2) influences the discipline response most
managers make, but not the tolerance response. We find no evidence to support an interaction between the type of employee
and the magnitude of the act (H3), which is like the findings of sales manager literature (Bellizzi and Bristol, 2005; Bellizzi
and Hasty, 2003; DeConinck, 1992).
Experiment 2: Hypotheses
In Experiment 2, we consider how managers respond to occupational fraud by an average employee, and how this varies
depending on how a star employee was previously treated for the same offense (i.e., was the star properly disciplined?).
Miceli, Near, Rehg, and Van Scotter (2012) observed that permitting an employee to engage in unethical behavior damages
monitoring and reporting mechanisms that were put in place to discover and punish unethical behavior (i.e., management
control systems). Ashkanasy et al., (2006) argue that when an employee observes unethical behavior being tolerated, it is
likely that the employee may eventually participate in unethical tacit collusion by perpetrating similar unethical acts.
Furthermore, research has reported that tacit knowledge and tacit collusion are influential in employees’ ethical behavior
(Painter-Morland, 2006) and that a small number of deviant employees can influence the ethical behavior of a large number
of employees (Dunlop and Lee, 2004). Ashforth and Anand (2003) report that company-wide corruption can start with one
or a small group of employees behaving unethically, which then spreads throughout the organization until the corruption
permeates the operations of the firm.
To our knowledge, accounting research has not addressed the impact that an executive selectively overriding management
control systems to allow a star employee to perpetrate occupational fraud has on future manager discipline/tolerance
responses when a similar act is perpetrated by an average employee. The current study examines the consequences of such
a weak tone at the top.

The magnitude of the act effect size is medium (Cohen’s f = 0.287) (Cohen, 1988).
The effect size for the type of employee is small (Cohen’s f = 0.221) (Cohen, 1988).
22
If we run the MANOVA and ANOVAs with the self-report (i.e., what the participants would do themselves) dependent variables
(using ranks due to the presence of heteroskedasticity), employee type is insignificant in all three of the models (p > 0.25 in each
case), while magnitude of the act is significant in all three models (p < 0.01 in each case). There is no evidence of an interaction
between employee type and magnitude of the act. Also, if we attempt to control for SDB by adding a BIAS variable (the difference
between each participant’s self-report response and his/her Most Managers response; Cohen et al., 2007) to these self-report
ANOVAs, employee type is marginally significant in the discipline ANOVA, but insignificant in the tolerance ANOVA.
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Based on Mitchell and Wood’s (1980) causal attribution model, the manager will weigh the costs/benefits associated when
disciplining/tolerating occupational fraud perpetrated by an average employee when a stakeholder has previously tolerated
a similar act perpetrated by a star employee. The anticipated benefit to disciplining the behavior from an average employee
is that doing so may increase the likelihood that corporate policy will be adhered to in the future. The cost of this discipline
is that employees will observe that stars and average employees are treated differently for the same fraudulent act, which is
likely to appear quite unfair.
The manager will also weigh the costs and benefits of not disciplining the act. The benefit in this example would be the
social reward of adhering to the organization’s unwritten rules of conduct (i.e., tacit knowledge and tacit collusion), which
would likely lead to greater comradeship with and cooperation from subordinates in the future. The cost of not disciplining
the act is potential sanctioning by upper management for tolerating a bad act, but this cost is lowered when stars have been
allowed to get away with the same act previously, as one could argue that a precedent was set.
After weighing the costs/benefits of the discipline decision, which appear to weigh in favor of tolerating the current act if a
prior act has been tolerated, we expect that the manager’s response to the average employee’s fraudulent act will be to show
greater tolerance and to administer a lower discipline intensity when a prior act perpetrated by a star employee has been
tolerated. Put formally as a hypothesis:
H4: Managers will be less likely to discipline and more likely to tolerate occupational fraud perpetrated by an
average employee if a star employee has been permitted to engage in a similar act in the past than if such an
act by a star employee has not been tolerated in the past.
We also predict that the magnitude of the act affects a manager’s discipline/tolerance response, as explained above for H2.
Specifically, we expect that a manager will exhibit greater discipline intensity and lower tolerance for a larger magnitude
fraudulent act than a smaller act. The costs/benefits factor of Mitchel and Wood’s (1980) model is different for a larger act
because of the potential for the manager to receive significant discipline if a larger unreported act is discovered by
stakeholders. As a result of the potential costs to the manager associated with a larger act, the manager is expected to
administer greater discipline intensity for (and be less tolerant of) larger acts than smaller acts. Put formally as a hypothesis:
H5: A manager’s discipline for (tolerance of) occupational fraud by an average employee increases (decreases) as
the magnitude of the act increases.
Additionally, as explained above for H3, we predict that there will be an interaction of prior act tolerance and the magnitude
of the act where the manager’s discipline/tolerance response becomes similar as the magnitude of the act increases. If the
act becomes large, we expect that an average employee will not be able to escape discipline even if the act had been tolerated
before when committed by a star. Put formally as hypothesis:
H6: As the magnitude of the act increases, manager discipline (tolerance) for acts previously tolerated or not
tolerated increases (decreases), such that the manager discipline (tolerance) response will become more similar
for prior tolerance or non-tolerance (an interaction between star employee tolerance and act magnitude).
Method
Participants
We collected the data for Experiment 2 from a different set of participants than in Experiment 1. As with Experiment 1, the
participants were required to have earned at a minimum a bachelor degree and have at least one year of professional
management experience.23 Such a sample is likely to include individuals who have made management control related
decisions in a professional business environment and who have likely observed the effect that prior act tolerance/intolerance
has on other employees within a business.

23

The mean age for Experiment 2 participants is 43.85 years, with a mean of 10.44 years of professional management experience.
Additionally, 81.5 percent of the participants in Experiment 2 had witnessed a small ethics violation as a manager, 74.1 percent had
reprimanded someone they managed for an ethics violation, and 50.9 percent had observed one category of employee receive less
severe punishment than other employees for the same violation. Accordingly, the participants in Experiment 2 have the professional
experience necessary to make the ethical discipline/tolerance decisions requested in the experimental case instrument.
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We obtained the sample for Experiment 2 using Qualtrics Research Panel service to recruit participants. Brandon et al.,
(2014) explain that Qualtrics Panel appoints a research project manager who is responsible for screening and obtaining
participants in a study, which occurred in the current study. They also report that the Qualtrics Research Panel service’s
approach to panel recruitment helps researchers to obtain data while decreasing the number of participants who may possibly
drop out of the experiment. In Experiment 2, the Qualtrics Research Panel project manager invited 145 participants to take
the instrument, of whom 108 passed both manipulation checks and the minimum criteria of at least having earned a bachelor
degree and one year of management experience. The average cost per participant in Experiment 2 was $17.66.
Experimental Case Study and Independent Variables
Experiment 2 uses a 2x2 between-subjects experimental design with two levels of prior star employee occupational fraud
tolerance (tolerated or not tolerated) and two levels of act magnitude perpetrated by an average employee (smaller act, larger
act).
The case used in this study is influenced by the case used by Bellizzi and Bristol (2005) in their supervising unethical selling
behavior study, and the case instrument requires the participant to assume the role of a customer fulfillment manager for a
remote-control airplane manufacturer who supervises seven warehouse managers. The customer fulfillment manager learns
that Terry, a warehouse manager, made an improper charge to a warehouse expense account for a personal vehicle repair.
There are two independent variables in this study. The first independent variable is prior occupational fraud perpetrated by
a star employee being tolerated or not tolerated by a stakeholder. In the case instrument, the CEO previously was informed
by the customer fulfillment manager that a star employee warehouse manager had authorized a personal vehicle repair on a
warehouse expense account. In response to that prior act, the CEO instructed the customer fulfillment manager to either
discipline/not discipline the warehouse manager for the inappropriate charge. This independent variable addresses H4 and
reflects whether a prior fraudulent act by a star employee had been tolerated or not. The second independent variable is the
magnitude of the act (both the current act and the prior act), smaller ($500) or larger ($5,000), and it addresses H5. Lastly,
the interaction of prior act tolerance and the magnitude of the act addresses H6.
Dependent Variables
Experiment 2 measures what the participant would do (as in Experiment 1, we ask a series of questions to examine how
they would personally respond and how various factors influenced their decision), and subsequently what most managers
the participant has worked with would do. In Experiment 2, there is no evidence of SDB in the discipline responses (p =
0.458). We do find evidence of SDB in the tolerance question (p = 0.005); however, it is only in the condition where the
star employee’s prior act was not tolerated (the control condition; p < 0.001), not in the test condition where the prior act
was tolerated (p = 0.844). Because we have mixed results for the presence of SDB, as well as the apparent SDB for tolerance
being only in the control condition, we use the self-report questions as the primary dependent variables for Experiment 2
and then conduct sensitivity tests on the tolerance results.24
Thus, the first dependent variable question is, “As a result of Terry’s personal vehicle repair charged on Warehouse #3’s
expense account, you would:” (0 = “Do Nothing”, 100 = “Terminate Terry”). The second dependent variable question is,
“How likely would it be that you would tolerate Terry’s violation of company policy?” (0 = “Not Likely to Tolerate”, 100
= “Very Likely to Tolerate”). As discussed above in Experiment 1, the scale used in this study was a modification of Hunt
and Vasquez-Parraga’s (1993) multiple choice scale used to measure the discipline intensity a sales manager would give a
salesperson for unethical behavior.
Results
Manipulation Checks and Completion Time
Qualtrics Panel invited 145 participants to take the instrument; 108 passed both manipulation checks and had the minimum
criteria of at least having earned a bachelor degree and one year of management experience.25 One hundred thirty-four of

24

We posit that there is less potential for SDB in Experiment 2 because the CEO has already responded to a prior fraudulent act, thus
creating a degree of precedence.
25
The MANOVA results in Table 3 are similar if we include all respondents in the analysis (n = 144), except that magnitude of the act
has p = 0.142.
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the 145 participants passed the magnitude manipulation check, and 114 passed the prior act tolerated manipulation check.
The average time of completion was 24.8 minutes (median of seventeen minutes).
Participants’ Perceptions of the Case
The participants in this study were asked their opinion of the realism and understandability of the case instrument. In
response to the question, “How realistic do you find this case?” (0 = “Realistic”, 100 = “Very Realistic”), the mean was
69.86 (standard deviation = 25.31). For the question, “How understandable do you find this case?” (0 = “Difficult to
Understand”, 100 = “Easy to Understand”), the mean was 82.92 (standard deviation = 16.85).26
Demographics
Table 1 also provides demographic information about the participants in Experiment 2. Fifty-seven percent were female,
and most were over forty years old (sixty-three percent). Most participants had more than five years of management
experience (sixty-three percent), and ninety-three percent were employed full-time. Most participants were currently
employed in mid- or high-level management positions (ninety-three percent), and most were currently employed at a firm
with greater than fifty-one employees (eighty-one percent). Fifty-six percent worked for private companies, twenty-one
percent for publicly traded firms, and thirteen percent for not-for-profit entities. Nearly all of the participants had earned a
bachelor degree (sixty-one percent), some graduate education (ten percent), or a masters/law degree (twenty-seven percent).
MANOVA Results
The two dependent variables are correlated (r = -0.269, p < 0.005), and as a result, we first run a MANOVA (significant at
p < 0.001). The results in Table 3 Panel A indicate that prior act tolerance is significant (p < 0.001) and that the magnitude
of the act is marginally significant (p = 0.087), consistent with H4 and H5. The MANOVA reveals no evidence of an
interaction of prior act tolerance and the magnitude of the act (p = 0.350), inconsistent with H6.
ANOVA Results
The discipline dependent variable in Experiment 2 asks, “As a result of Terry’s personal vehicle repair charged on
Warehouse #3’s expense account, you would: “(0 = “Do Nothing”, 100 = “Terminate Terry”). The descriptive statistics
indicate that the means for a similar star employee’s behavior not tolerated (73.18) and tolerated (47.81) in the past are
significantly different (p < 0.001), consistent with H4. The means for a smaller magnitude act (57.19) and a larger magnitude
act (66.73) are marginally different (p = 0.061), consistent with H5.
The two-way ANOVA results for the discipline dependent variable are shown in Panel B of Table 3. The overall model is
significant (p < 0.001). The prior act tolerated variable is significant (p < 0.001, F = 32.67), which lends support to H4.27
Magnitude of the act is also statistically significant (p = 0.027, F = 5.02), supporting H5.28 The interaction is not statistically
significant (p = 0.175, F = 1.87), inconsistent with H6. [see Table 3, pg 314]
The tolerance dependent variable in Experiment 2 asks, “How likely would it be that you would tolerate Terry’s violation
of company policy?” (0 = “Not Likely to Tolerate”, 100 = “Very Likely to Tolerate”). The descriptive statistics for the
tolerance dependent variable reveal that the means for a prior tolerance of a fraudulent act perpetrated by a star employee
(44.51) and for a prior act not being tolerated (24.05) are significantly different (p < 0.001), consistent with H4. The mean
for a smaller magnitude act (33.12) and the larger act mean (32.80) are not significantly different (p = 0.995), which is
inconsistent with H5.
The two-way ANOVA results for the tolerance dependent variable are reported in Table 3 Panel C. The overall model is
significant (p = 0.002). There is statistical significance (p < 0.001, F = 15.45) for the prior act tolerated variable (H4) in this
model.29 Neither the magnitude variable (p = 0.926, F = 0.01; H5) nor the interaction of the prior act tolerated and magnitude
of the act (p = 0.501, F = 0.46; H6) were statistically significant.
As noted above, we find evidence of SDB in the tolerance responses, but it is only in the control condition. We conduct two
sensitivity tests to address SDB in Experiment 2. First, consistent with the analysis for Experiment 1, we rerun the tolerance
26

Both realistic and understandable have means that are significantly greater than the scale midpoint of 50 (p < 0.001).
The prior act tolerated effect size is large (Cohen’s f = 0.560) (Cohen, 1988).
28
The magnitude of the act effect size is small (Cohen’s f = 0.220) (Cohen, 1988).
29
The effect size for prior act tolerated is small (Cohen’s f = 0.385) (Cohen 1988).
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ANOVA for Experiment 2 using the Most Managers tolerance question as the dependent variable. This model is
insignificant (p = 0.437), as is the prior tolerance variable (p = 0.230). Second, as in Cohen et al., (2007), we add a covariate
to the tolerance ANOVA reported in Table 3, Panel C. This covariate is BIAS, the difference between each participant’s
self-report tolerance response and his/her Most Managers tolerance response. In this analysis, the ANOVA model is
significant (p < 0.001), as are the prior tolerance variable (p = 0.002) and the BIAS variable (p < 0.001). Thus, the tolerance
ANOVA results in Experiment 2 are sensitive to the manner in which SDB is addressed.
When the results of the two ANOVAs in Experiment 2 are considered together, both ANOVAs support H4 (prior tolerance
of the act), although the tolerance ANOVA results should be interpreted with caution given the mixed findings in the SDB
sensitivity testing. The results are mixed regarding H5 (the magnitude of the act), which is supported in the ANOVA for
the discipline variable, but not for the tolerance variable. The ANOVAs provide no evidence of an interaction between prior
act tolerance and the magnitude of the act (H6). This is similar to the findings in Experiment 1 of this study, as well as the
sales manager literature (Bellizzi and Bristol, 2005; Bellizzi and Hasty, 2003; DeConinck, 1992).
Conclusion
This study extends prior research by examining first whether non-sales star employees are permitted to engage in more
occupational fraud than average employees and second, and more importantly, whether a tone at the top that tolerates/does
not tolerate a star employee’s occupational fraud affects the management control system (i.e., the discipline/tolerance
response) for subsequent acts perpetrated by an average employee. We find that participants perceive that most managers
treat star employees more leniently than average employees. We also find evidence that a tone at the top that tolerates a
prior anti-company fraudulent act by a star employee (i.e., tacit knowledge of past tolerance) influences the managerial
response to an average employee who subsequently perpetrates a similar act (i.e., tacit collusion with the unwritten rules of
conduct), thus compromising management control systems.
The Treadway Commission (NCFFR, 1987) indicated that tone at the top is the primary influence for ethical behavior in an
organization, and the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ, 2010) reported that the ethical tone at the top is highly influential in
the ethical behavior of those in middle- and lower-level positions in a company. Our results suggest that management control
systems are made less effective when a star employee is permitted to engage in occupational fraud and overriding
management control systems for the star employee likely leads to similar fraudulent acts by average employees being
handled more leniently. Thus, the effects of a weak tone at the top can spread occupational fraud throughout the organization.
We recognize that the study has some limitations. First, we examine only two hypothetical situations, and it is not clear that
the results would generalize to other settings. Second, we encountered SDB in Experiment 1 and to a limited extent in
Experiment 2. We have done our best to address the SDB and to present a variety of analyses to determine the robustness
of the results. Finally, the two experiments involved different methods of data collection, as well as somewhat different
participant demographic profiles (e.g., Experiment 2 participants are older and more experienced). However, we found no
evidence that age or experience affect the results of either experiment.
Despite these limitations, we believe that the results have implications for academic research, practitioners, and policy
makers. From a research perspective, this study extends star employee research beyond the sales realm to occupational fraud
by non-sales employees. We find that respondents perceive that the tolerance and discipline decisions of most managers
they have worked with are significantly influenced by the type of employee being disciplined. Researchers could use this
knowledge to investigate this phenomenon further, such as focusing on organizational and personal factors that may affect
how most managers discipline a star employee versus an average employee. In addition, this study provides evidence that
tolerating star employee occupational fraud affects subsequent manager discipline decisions. This knowledge may allow
researchers to investigate the specific reasons why an executive would choose to exhibit a poor tone at the top and if
management control implications are evaluated during executive discipline decision making.
Policymakers and practitioners can use the findings of this study to focus their efforts on identifying occupational fraud in
organizations. Specifically, such frauds appear to be especially likely to be tolerated when they are committed by star
employees and/or when they are small. Such frauds may spread throughout the organization through tacit collusion as
subsequent managers also choose to tolerate fraudulent acts, ultimately producing much more significant losses. The
findings also may help policymakers and practitioners to understand that the tolerance of fraudulent acts by stars and smaller
acts may reflect the tone at the top and the ethical climate of the organization that the Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners (ACFE, 2016), Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO, 2013), and Center for Audit Quality (CAQ,
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2010) deem so important in addressing fraud risk. Ultimately, tolerance of occupational fraud in an organization can
significantly contribute to the high cost of occupational fraud (ACFE, 2016).
Further, this study has important implications for policy makers who may be inclined to minimize the punishment for smaller
ethical violations. Experiment 2 revealed that disciplining current unethical acts has an effect on the discipline administered
for similar subsequent unethical acts. This study suggests that policy makers consider the discipline intensity they build into
regulations for smaller acts of unethical behavior, knowing that the disciplinary action related to current acts may be a
preventative action against future unethical acts.
Also, this study could assist in training executives and top managers, so they may better understand their own decisionmaking processes before they negatively affect their organization’s control environment. Such training may help to curb
smaller magnitude unethical acts that managers are more likely to tolerate, especially when perpetrated by star employees
whose performance positively affects the top manager’s income. Prior research has demonstrated that corruption often starts
with a single occurrence of a smaller unethical act that grows into organization-wide accepted behavior (Ashforth and
Anand, 2003). Experiment 1 revealed that the participants perceived that the typical manager was likely influenced by the
type of employee committing the act. Such knowledge could help managers to better understand how disciplinary decisions
are made with respect to star and average employees, which have the potential to weaken the control environment.
This study’s results also have implications for top managers and executives because they highlight an advantage of adopting
a zero-tolerance policy for unethical behavior. This is especially important when one considers that Experiment 2 revealed
that the existence of prior tolerance/non-tolerance by a top manager/executive is a significant factor in the disciplinary
decisions that managers make. Thus, prior unethical act tolerance/non-tolerance by an executive or top manager has an
impact on the control environment, which affects how subsequent unethical acts are handled.
To extend the current study, future research could use a face-to-face experiment to attempt to more accurately create the
external pressures managers feel when making discipline decisions related to occupational fraud. Future studies could
investigate how middle and lower managers’ perceptions of the tone at the top influence their discipline and tolerance
responses for occupational fraud perpetrated by both star employee and average employee subordinates. Future studies
could investigate the personal and organizational factors that likely influence the discipline decisions managers make, such
as job security, personal financial stability, and career mobility. Future research could investigate whether race or gender of
the manager has any influence on discipline/tolerance decisions, although we found no evidence of gender effects in this
study. Finally, this study could stimulate research that helps us to further understand the factors that influence fraudulent
behavior tolerance within an organization, which may reveal how fraudulent behavior spreads in organizations.
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Figure 1:
Leader’s Response to Subordinate Poor Performance Causal Attribution Model
(Mitchell and Wood 1980)

Expectations for
Future
Performance

Situational and
Informational
Factors

Causal Attribution
(Internal &
External Factors)

Behavior and/or
Outcome

Bias

Response

Costs / Benefits

Personal or
Organizational
Policy

310

Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting
Volume 10: Issue 3, July–December 2018
Table 1:
Demographics
Exper. 1
Star Employee
Tolerance
(n = 119)

Exper. 2
Effect of Star
Employee
Tolerance
(n = 108)

Gender
Male
Female

54%
46%
72%
28%

43%
57%
(n = 107)
37%
63%

67%
33%

37%
63%

77%
16%
7%
(n = 117)
34%
38%
7%
18%
3%
(n = 116)
9%
8%
14%
28%
8%
33%
(n = 116)
22%
48%
9%
14%
7%

93%
5%
2%

68%
10%
20%
2%

61%
10%
27%
2%

Age
40 years or below
Over 40 years old
Years professional management experience
5 Years or Less
More than 5 Years
Employment status
Full-time
Part-time
Unemployed
Current management level
Low-Level
Mid-Level
Senior-Level
Not Currently a Manager
Other
Size of current employer (# of employees)
1 or Sole Proprietor
2 to 10
11 to 50
51 to 500
501 to 1,000
More than 1,000
Type of entity currently work for
Publicly Traded
Privately Owned
Government
Not-for-Profit
Other
Highest educational degree earned
Undergraduate Degree
Some Graduate Education
Masters / Law Degree
Doctoral Degree
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7%
56%
37%
0%
0%
1%
6%
12%
35%
11%
35%
21%
56%
9%
13%
1%

Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting
Volume 10: Issue 3, July–December 2018
Table 2:
Experiment 1
MANOVA and ANOVAs
Panel A: MANOVA a
Model
Employee Type (H1)
Magnitude of the Act (H2)
Employee Type X Magnitude of the Act (H3)

F-statistic
2.84
3.82
4.72
0.68

p-value
0.011
0.025
0.011
0.509

Small Act
73.38
(22.26)
n = 34
62.00
(24.02)
n = 28
68.24
(23.58)
n = 62

Mean
(SD)
Large Act
84.38
(14.73)
n = 26
75.61
(23.61)
n = 31
79.61
(20.37)
n = 57

df
1
1
1
3
115

Mean
Squared
2990.06
4460.26
50.17
2305.99
470.118

Panel B: Means (SDs) and ANOVA for Discipline
“What do you think most managers you have worked
with would do if confronted with the situation presented
in this case?” (0 = “Do Nothing”, 100 = “Terminate
Chris”).
Average Employee

Star Employee

Total

Employee Type (H1)
Magnitude of the Act (H2)
Employee Type x Magnitude of the Act (H3)
Corrected Model
Error
R-Squared = 0.113 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.090)
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Total
78.15
(19.98)
n = 60
69.15
(24.57)
n = 59
73.69
(22.73)
n = 119

F-statistic
6.36
9.49
0.11
4.91

p-value
0.013
0.003
0.745
0.003
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Panel C: Means (SDs) and ANOVA for Tolerance
“How likely would it be that most managers you have
worked with would tolerate Chris’s violation of
company policy?” (0 = “Not Likely”, 100 = “Very
Likely”).
Average Employee

Star Employee

Total

Employee Type (H1)
Magnitude of the Act (H2)
Employee Type x Magnitude of the Act (H3)
Corrected Model
Error
R-Squared = 0.072 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.048)

Small Act
20.88
(20.85)
n = 34
38.50
(31.90)
n = 28
28.84
(27.64)
n = 62

Mean
(SD)
Large Act
18.58
(28.78)
n = 26
24.94
(28.20)
n = 31
22.04
(28.39)
n = 57

df
1
1
1
3
115

Mean
Squared
4231.7
1853.98
933.17
2237.42
751.24

Total
19.88
(24.40)
n = 60
31.37
(30.52)
n = 59
25.58
(28.09)
n = 119

F-statistic
5.63
2.47
1.24
2.98

p-value
0.019
0.119
0.267
0.035

a

The dependent variables are Discipline Intensity and Tolerance of most managers the participants have worked with, each on a 0-100
scale. See Panels B and C for the wording of each question.
Independent variables: (1) Employee Type = 1 for star employee, 0 for average employee, and (2) Magnitude of the Act = 1 for large
act, 0 for small act.
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Table 3:
Experiment 2
MANOVA and ANOVAs
Panel A: MANOVA a
Model
Prior Act Tolerated (H4)
Magnitude of the Act (H5)
Prior Act Tolerated X Magnitude of the Act (H6)

F-statistic
7.513
21.569
2.500
1.060

p-value
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.087
0.350

Small Act
71.14
(18.96)
n = 29
39.61
(24.68)
n = 23
57.19
(26.65)
n = 52

Mean
(SD)
Large Act
75.03
(20.11)
n = 32
55.67
(28.48)
n = 24
66.73
(25.70)
n = 56

df
1
1
1
3
104

Mean
Squared
17167.42
2638.26
980.79
6782.56
525.45

Panel B: Means and ANOVA for Discipline
“As a result of Terry’s personal vehicle repair charged
on Warehouse #3’s expense account, you would: (0 =
Do Nothing, 100 = Terminate Terry).”
Prior Act Not Tolerated

Prior Act Tolerated

Total

Prior Act Tolerated (H4)
Magnitude of the Act (H5)
Prior Act Tolerated X Magnitude of the Act (H6)
Corrected Model
Error
R-Squared = 0.271 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.250)
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Total
73.18
(19.51)
n = 61
47.81
(27.62)
n = 47
62.14
(26.47)
n = 108

F-statistic
32.67
5.02
1.87
12.91

p-value
< 0.001
0.027
0.175
< 0.001
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Panel C: Means and ANOVA for Tolerance
“How likely would it be that you would tolerate Terry’s
violation of company policy? (0 = Not Likely, 100 =
Very Likely).”
Prior Act Not Tolerated

Prior Act Tolerated

Total

Prior Act Tolerated (H4)
Magnitude of the Act (H5)
Prior Act Tolerated X Magnitude of the Act (H6)
Corrected Model
Error
R-Squared = 0.132 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.106)

Small Act
22.45
(24.34)
n = 29
46.57
(29.99)
n = 23
33.12
(29.32)
n = 52

Mean
(SD)
Large Act
25.50
(25.32)
n = 32
42.54
(28.99)
n = 24
32.80
(28.02)
n = 56

df
1
1
1
3
104

Mean
Squared
11227.84
6.26
331.79
3815.33
726.72

Total
24.05
(24.70)
n = 61
44.51
(29.23)
n = 47
32.95
(28.52)
n = 108

F-statistic
15.45
0.01
0.46
5.25

p-value
< 0.001
0.926
0.501
0.002

a

The dependent variables are Discipline Intensity and Tolerance, each on a 0-100 scale. See Panels B and C for the wording of each
question.
Independent variables: (1) Prior Act Tolerated = 1 for yes, 0 for no, and (2) Magnitude of the Act = 1 for large act, 0 for small act.
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